Margot James: When we leave the European Union, the direct jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the UK will come to an end. Clause 6 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill gives effect to that and takes a clear and logical approach to how our domestic courts should approach the case law of the CJEU as a result. In short, where a judgment precedes our exit, it is binding on courts below the Supreme Court. Where a judgment post-dates our exit, our courts may have regard to it if they consider it appropriate, but EU law and the decisions of the ECJ will continue to affect us. The ECJ determines whether agreements that the EU has struck are legal under the EU’s own law. If, as part of our future partnership, Parliament passes an identical law to an EU law, it may make sense for our courts to look at the appropriate ECJ judgments so that we interpret those laws consistently, but our Parliament would ultimately remain sovereign.
If we agree that the UK should continue to participate in an EU body or agency such as the European Data Protection Board, the UK would of course have to respect the remit of the ECJ in that specific regard, but our Parliament would remain ultimately sovereign. It could, for example, decide not to accept those rules, but with consequences inevitably for our membership of the relevant agency and linked market access rights.
The approach is sensible and realistic. Opposition Members have suggested that if the UK is to achieve the future relationship with the EU on data protection that we seek, we must follow the jurisprudence of the ECJ post-Brexit in respect of data protection. We do not believe this to be the case. There are a number of existing precedents where the EU has reached agreements with third countries that provide for a close co-operative relationship with the CJEU having direct jurisdiction over those countries. It is worth quoting directly from the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, which states:
“A court or tribunal need not have regard to anything done on or after exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate to do so.”
I should make it clear that the provision does not seek to legislate for the content of a withdrawal agreement or implementation period. If there is a role for the CJEU as part of the agreement, as has been set out in the joint report in relation to citizens’ rights, it would be legislated for under the separate withdrawal agreement and implementation period, but it would not be right to try to legislate now in anticipation of a final legal text agreed with the EU on the terms of our withdrawal from the EU.
The position in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill reflects the reality that in leaving the EU we will be ending the direct jurisdiction of the CJEU over our  domestic courts while also allowing judges to take account of post-exit CJEU judgments. This is similar to how the UK courts can currently take into account judgments made by courts from other jurisdictions, although of course we recognise that as the text of our law and EU law will at the outset be the same or substantially similar in many cases, it is highly likely in practice that our courts may find it helpful to look at the CJEU judgments, and that is perfectly legitimate and sensible for them to do so.

Margot James: The Government are absolutely committed to getting an adequacy agreement. The Prime Minister has said she wishes to go beyond adequacy in the negotiations. I would like to reassure the right hon. Gentleman that the very opposite is the case. Our courts can have regard to, and that is good enough. There is no reason for this to be different in the area of data protection from what it might be in any other area.
The provision has been discussed at length and agreed to by the House. Hon. Members will be aware that the other place is now scrutinising the EU (Withdrawal) Bill and has focused on this very matter. There is broad agreement that we need to consider how best to ensure that the Data Protection Bill achieves the policy aim with sufficient clarity. We want to reach agreement on a proposition that commands the greatest possible support. We should, however, be wary of seeking to provide for   something that alters the underlying policy in a way that binds or steers our courts towards a particular outcome, for example, by saying that they must have regard in only certain areas of law.